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The Perils of Professionalism: Lawyers, Teachers, 
and Engineers in Nazi Germany [1986] 
Konrad H. Jarausch  
Abstract: »Gefahren des Professionalismus: Anwälte, Lehrer und Ingenieure 
im Dritten Reich«. The contradiction between the professions’ progressive self-
representation and their self-seeking opportunism was especially disastrous in 
their collaboration with National Socialism. As a result of the overcrowding 
and unemployment in the late Weimar Republic, many well educated Germans 
lent a willing ear to the radical propaganda of NS-affiliates which clamored for 
the exclusion of Jews, Leftists and women. While young, male, Aryan univer-
sity graduates profited from the Nazi seizure of power, their hopes for a repro-
fessionalization were quickly dashed by the loss of autonomy and ideological 
indoctrination in favor of race, war and empire. Many professionals therefore 
experienced the Third Reich as a severe deprofessionalization by decreasing 
their number, weakening their training, abolishing their organizational freedom 
and involving them in atrocities. On the basis of the German example, the ar-
ticle therefore tries to warn against the consequences of ignoring the ethical 
foundations of liberal professionalism. 
Keywords: professions, collaboration with National Socialism, crisis of pro-
fessions, Nazi affiliates, professional purges, deprofessionalization, reprofes-
sionalization. 
 
In academic circles, the notion of professionalism has a nicely progressive ring. 
Unlike athletics, where it smacks of greed, it suggests competent, disinterested 
service of well-trained experts. What client would not rather consult a “profes-
sional” lawyer than a legal amateur, go to a university-educated teacher than to 
a self-proclaimed pedagogue, or employ a certified engineer rather than some-
one merely good at fixing machines? It should not be surprising that profes-
sionals themselves have been interested in promoting such a positive image, 
since it guarantees them wealth, social status – and better yet, a good con-
science. But it is somewhat unexpected that many historians or social scientists 
have accepted this ideology at face value and touted professionalization as 
unquestioned progress. The sociologist Talcott Parsons affirmed authoritative-
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ly: “The massive emergence of the professional complex, not the special status 
of capitalistic or socialistic modes of organization, is the crucial structural 
development of twentieth-century society.”1 Since academics are themselves 
professionals, they tend to view professionalization not only as beneficial, but 
also as inevitable. 
The rise of professionalism has, however, also exacted a heavy price. Did it 
not mean a drastic foreshortening of choice, putting the client at the mercy of 
officially sanctioned solutions rather than those he wanted? What about the 
increased expense of professional services, compared to lay advice? Has the 
displacement of competitors with less political power always been an unmixed 
blessing for society? On closer inspection, the “culture of professionalism” 
seems also to have a darker, more problematic side. During the last decade 
historians and social scientists have, therefore, begun to ask disturbing ques-
tions about its implications.  
Increasing attention is being paid instead to some of the less edifying features 
of professional behavior – to the efforts of professional groups to enlarge their 
power, income, and status through monopolistic practices; to the sometimes 
bitter struggles between competing professions or between upper and lower 
branches of the same profession; and to the role that professions can play in 
legitimizing social stratification, economic disparities, and mechanisms of so-
cial control.2  
Perhaps a comparative perspective can help resolve the contradictions between 
the progressive and conspiratorial views of professionalism. With its highly 
developed system of academic occupations, Germany offers an interesting 
contrast to the Anglo-American pattern that dominates the current discussion. 
Although the notion of Berufsstand is the functional equivalent of “profession,” 
it has a somewhat different ideological ring with stronger religious (calling) 
and premodern (estate) connotations. The strengths and limits of professional-
ism also come into clearer focus in an extreme situation such as during the 
Third Reich when its very survival and ethics were in question.3 To avoid the 
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narrowness of most single-profession studies it is essential to represent the 
three major employment situations, such as free professions (lawyers), state 
officials (high-school teachers), and white collar employees in business (gradu-
ate engineers). It is, moreover, necessary to chart tensions within occupations 
between elites, normal practitioners, and marginal members (such as beginners, 
the less qualified, etc.). The complexities of professionalization also require a 
multidimensional approach, beginning with education (training, certifying), but 
including also economic well-being (market control, income), and social status 
(societal esteem), taking into account ethics (values, self-image) as well as 
organizational efforts (interest group politics).4 The subsequent reflections 
therefore address a double question: How can one, in absence of a firm mono-
graphic base, begin to think about the contradictory role of the professions in 
the Third Reich? Is professionalism inherently problematic or do its perils stem 
from particular misuses under peculiar circumstances?  
The German professions welcomed the Nazi seizure of power with re-
strained enthusiasm. The Deutsche Philologenverband pledged its participation 
“in the service of national rebuilding,” hoping that the Third Reich would end 
the professional crisis of the Weimar Republic and thereby lead to “re”-
professionalization. As I have recently suggested in the Journal of Contempo-
rary History, in the last years before 1933 German professionals faced severe 
overcrowding of the universities, which resulted in a sizable overproduction of 
graduates clamoring for entry into the professions. At the same time, the Great 
Depression threw tens of thousands of industrial employees out of work, de-
creased the incomes of free professionals (fewer people used their services), 
and cut the salaries of government officials between one-third and one-half. 
Although professionals generally suffered less than white or blue collar work-
ers, they reacted sharply to this relative deprivation, since their status and self-
esteem rested on an elevated (standesgemäße) lifestyle which they were unable 
to maintain. Hence many identified their particular plight with a “crisis” of law, 
of culture, or of technology, and began to call for exclusionist solutions (nu-
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merous clausus) such as barring beginners, Jewish competitors, or newly pro-
fessionalized women.5  
When the established organizations such as the Deutsche Anwaltsverein, 
Deutsche Philologenverband, or Verein Deutscher Ingenieure could not alle-
viate their plight, a few professionals searched for radical alternatives on the 
Left (Republican Lawyers’ League, Association of Socialist Teachers, AFLD, 
etc.). But greater numbers founded Nazi professional leagues such as the Bund 
NS Deutscher Juristen for lawyers (1928), the NS Lehrerbund for teachers 
(1926-1929), or the Kampfbund der Deutschen Architekten und Ingenieure for 
engineers (1931). Young and technical professionals especially succumbed to 
the Nazi lure. Discouraged by the failure of the last republican and the final 
authoritarian governments, by January 1933 the majority of professionals 
looked for more energetic action from the Nazi cabinet. “The [new] govern-
ment has received a mandate from the German people which exceeds all pre-
vious powers. It is inspired by the purest will and by irresistible resolve. We 
want to serve it,” the high-school teachers vowed: “Our goal must be the main-
tenance of organizational tradition, expertise and integrity as well as the fusion 
of the valuable experiences of the past with the living forces of the present.”6 
But would the Nazis respect professionalism, would they at least allow exper-
tise to exist or would they be hostile to its central ethical values? 
The first aim of Nazi professional policy was the Gleichschaltung (that is, 
control) of the occupational organizations. Among lawyers the NS-takeover 
was swift, but somewhat incomplete. Already in March 1933, prominent Jew-
ish and democratic professional leaders resigned from the boards. Confronted 
with an ultimatum by the rabid Nazi jurist Roland Freisler, undermined by an 
NS trojan horse (Voss) from within and misled by assurances from Reichsjuris-
tenführer Hans Frank, on May 18 the delegate Assembly of the Deutsche An-
waltsverein ratified the collective integration of their organization into the 
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BNSDJ, hoping to maintain its integrity within the larger Nazi legal umbrella. 
But under the leader of the Fachgruppe Rechsanwälte, W. Raeke the approx-
imately 15,000 member DAV was formally dissolved in December 1933, its 
considerable assets squandered and its newsletter nazified. Only in local bar 
associations and the internationally famous journal Juristische Wochenschrift 
did a vestige of former autonomy survive.7  
The coordination of high-school teachers proved more difficult. Led by the 
charismatic Bayreuth public schoolteacher Hans Schemm, the NS teachers’ 
league (NSLB) quickly bludgeoned the 150,000 strong Deutsche Lehrerverein 
(DLV) of primary school teachers into submission. But the academically 
trained Philologen refused to be swallowed by this mass organization of their 
intellectual or social inferiors, thinking that as traditional nationalists they only 
had to nazify their leadership under Kurt Schwedtke in order to survive. Sup-
ported by the Prussian Minister of Interior Frick, the Philologenverband sought 
to rally other remaining teachers’ organizations in a Deutsche Erzieher Ge-
meinschaft (DEG), conceding only political leadership to the NSLB, but insist-
ing on its professional autonomy. By the spring of 1935 the appearance of a 
competing NS journal for high-school teachers (the Deutsche Höhere Schule), 
the erosion of local membership which was pressured to resign, and the lack of 
support by the education ministry led to the collapse of the Philologenblatt and 
to the dissolution of the association in 1936. The some 30,000 academic teach-
ers were individually forced to join the NSLB, which maintained only a special 
Fachschaft (section) for them, ending all organizational autonomy.8  
Curiously enough, among the engineers the Gleichschaltung was the most 
complicated and protracted. The self-nazification of the leadership of the 
28,140 member Verein deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) made it possible to beat off 
an overt takeover attempt by the cranky Gottfried Feder (and the KDAI) in the 
spring of 1933. By combining four other organizations into a Reichsbund der 
deutschen Technik (RTA), the engineers effectively used the greater freedom of 
the technical and economic spheres to maintain their organizational identity. 
Only the foundation of an efficient NS Bund der Deutschen Technik (NSBDT), 
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led by the dynamic Autobahn-builder Fritz Todt, created an attractive NS alter-
native which succeeded in foiling the designs of the DAF (the yellow union of 
the Third Reich) and in swallowing the RTA from the inside. In the spring of 
1937 the technical professional associations were transformed into subsidiaries 
of the NSBDT, with sixteen of formerly eighty groups surviving in nine sec-
tions (Fachschaften) with their previous journals. About 81,000 of the approx-
imately 222,000 engineers were therefore under Nazi leadership, albeit more 
indirectly than the other professionals.9  
A second major thrust of NS policy towards the professions was the allevia-
tion of the professional crisis, inherited from the Weimar Republic. In the 
spring of 1933 professional organizations like the Philologenverband were 
clamoring for “1) an immediate regulation of the influx” of new professionals 
and for “2) the restoration of normal working conditions.” Built on earlier 
discussions, ministerial preparations and suggestions of NS affiliates, Nazi 
measures could be drastic in intent and thorough in implementation, since they 
were no longer restrained by parliamentary considerations. The most dramatic 
initiative was the ruthless purge of public officials and professionals, euphe-
mistically called “the law for the restoration of professional public service” of 
March 9, 1933. Directed primarily against Nazi political enemies on the Left, it 
aimed to eliminate all communist and other politically unreliable officials on 
the basis of a lengthy questionnaire. Animated by virulent anti-Semitism, this 
law also fired all Jewish public servants, unless they had been appointed before 
1914 or had served in the First World War. Aside from state employees like 
teachers, it also involved free professionals and industrial employees, since the 
lawyers’ and engineers’ organizations on their own expelled their “undesira-
ble” members, gradually robbing them of their livelihood. Within the restricted 
religious classification of the German census, the anti-Semitic purge applied to 
1,443 engineers (.71%), 1,640 teachers (.57%), and 3,030 lawyers (a sizable 
16.25%), while broader racial definitions later increased these figures consider-
ably.10  
The “law against the overcrowding of German schools and universities” of 
April 25, 1933 was a second crisis response. It sought to regulate “the number 
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of pupils and students to such a degree that thorough training is assured and the 
demand for professionals is satisfied.” In practice this innocuous language 
meant a quota system, halving the number of males to be admitted to college, 
limiting female students to ten percent of the males, and restricting the number 
of Jewish pupils to the presumed proportion of non-Aryans in the German 
population (1.5%). (By 1938 the Nuremberg Laws and subsequent anti-Semitic 
orders had forced three-fourths of the remaining 27,500 Jewish children out of 
public education.) Even if it was not always strictly adhered to and student 
numbers had started to decline of their own accord, this decree and further 
guidelines contributed to a drastic reduction of educational access.11 
A final group of measures barred entry into certain professions such as law 
to females, and short of accepting a full numerus clausus, made professional 
training after college more competitive and time-consuming in order to frighten 
off applicants. The badly paid apprenticeship for young lawyers was extended 
to an unprecedented four years. Only half of the number of applicants was 
admitted as high-school teacher trainees, also screened increasingly according 
to political standards, such as NS party or Hitler Youth membership.12 For 
those professionals not affected by the dismissals or those students not barred 
from training, these stringent Nazi measures promised to restore the old im-
perial luster to professional careers.  
Another area of Nazi concern was the redefinition of professional ideology 
as the basis for restored practice, purged of the “abuses” of the liberal and 
socialist “system.” Through a complex dialogue between Old Fighter fanatics, 
nazified ministerial bureaucrats, and nationalist professors, new professional 
aims and roles gradually evolved in the Third Reich. Under the leadership of 
the ambitious lawyer Hans Frank and his Academy for German Law, jurists 
developed a conception of deutsches Volksrecht as a “typical instrument of 
order.” In sharp contrast to the individualistic legal tradition, law now became 
“the fulfillment of the idea of community: What guarantees the existence of a 
people is just.” Such a recasting of both criminal and civil law in accord with 
the racial, biological, and communitarian values of NS Weltanschauung re-
quired the creation of a new type of attorney, “not as representative of the 
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interests of his client, but as participant in the finding of justice in each particu-
lar case.” Only lawyers who possessed “a certain ideological-political as well 
as substantive qualification” could function in such a conciliatory rather than 
adversary role.13 
High-school teachers faced an equally drastic recasting of their professional 
goals: “German youth shall be consciously molded according to the principles 
of national-socialist Weltanschauung.” Inspired by the völkisch pedagogy of E. 
Krieck and A. Bäumler, German teachers were no longer primarily to transmit 
knowledge or to shape neohumanist personalities, but rather to form racially 
conscious National Socialists. Such novel methods as communal education 
(Gemeinschaftserziehung) and new topics such as Germanic mythology, racial 
science, and athletic competition necessitated a restructuring of secondary 
institutions to concentrate pupils in the nationalistic Deutsche Oberschule and 
to separate female secondary training (for motherhood) once again. Instead of a 
scholar, the teacher now was supposed to be an Erzieherpersönlichkeit who 
educated by the force of his personality as much as by his superior knowledge. 
“It must be a self-evident duty for every high-school teacher ... to participate in 
some manner in the broader social life of our people, if not in the party then in 
the SA, the Volkswohlfahrt, the civil defense ... and so on.”14  
On the surface less overtly ideological, engineers nonetheless transformed 
their professional self-image along the lines of “reactionary modernism.” In 
response to anti-technological criticism, the Diplomingenieure especially de-
veloped a technocratic communitarianism as solution to the “cultural crisis.” 
This vague notion of Gemeinschaftsarbeit could be turned towards National 
Socialism in spite of the latter’s neo-romantic and irrational strains. Nazi tech-
nicians sought to throw off the dual yoke of capitalism and bureaucracy, prom-
ising that “a technical spirit will very largely determine the face of the emerg-
ing Third Reich.” The NS-engineer would, in return for growing influence, 
have to “abandon his materialist outlook” as well as his apolitical reserve. In 
such a new spirit he ought to tackle his practical tasks of  
creating work in town and countryside, broadening the raw-material base, re-
socializing the unemployed through settlement, training citizenship through 
labor-service, strengthening our armed forces and Gleichschaltung of technic-
al education. 
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With Hitler’s personal blessing, engineers would become the pioneers of “pro-
gress for all Volksgenossen.”15  
While some resented NS organizational control, most practicing profession-
als responded positively to Nazi “reprofessionalization.” At least the Hitler 
government seemed to be doing something about their vexing problems and the 
nationalist ring of its rhetoric encouraged the illusion of a restoration regime. 
To be sure the “intoxicated enthusiasm” of the seizure of power soon wore off 
and in mid-1934 Socialist reporters noted a decided “change of mood” among 
professionals: But grumbling about “brutalization of justice” among attorneys, 
“reglementation” of the school among teachers or overwork in the factories 
among engineers became a harmless habit which indirectly helped stabilize the 
Nazi regime. For instance, the introduction of compulsory labor service for 
both sexes after high-school graduation and the reintroduction of military con-
scription lengthened the education process. But, as compensation, Minister of 
Education Rust shortened secondary schooling by one year (to eight) starting in 
1937, in order to “guarantee the two most important goals of manpower for the 
army and the university.” Similarly, the sharper physical, character, intellec-
tual, and racial “selection of pupils in the high schools” narrowed access to 
professional education, but could be interpreted positively as völkisch elite 
building.16  
With the lessening influx of new graduates, the purge of Jewish and leftist 
competitors, and the gradual return of full employment, the economic situation 
of the professionals improved dramatically. In 1937, the office for “career 
counseling” (Berufsbetreuung) for attorneys proudly pointed to “improving 
professional prospects.” Two years later the head of the lawyer’s section of the 
NSRB grudgingly admitted “that the professional income of the attorneys has 
increased,” indicating that even in this most overcrowded occupation material 
conditions were getting considerably better. Teachers could similarly note with 
satisfaction that in the spring of 1935 the state hiring freeze was lifted so that 
“the situation of the assessors has turned around.” The rescinding of some of 
the last economy measures of the Weimar cabinet (such as the extension of the 
teaching load) not only led to the rehiring of a thousand dismissed high-school 
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May 17, June 26, November 6, 1934, passim. “Bestimmungen über den Eintritt in den Ar-
beitsdienst,” Deutsche Höhere Schule, 3 (1936), p. 390; C. Barzel, “Die Verkürzung der 
Schulzeit in Zahlen,” ibid., 4 (1937), p. 28ff; Minister Rust decree, “Schülerauslese an den 
höheren Schulen,” ibid., 2 (1935), p. 262f. 
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teachers, but to some improvement in their pay – even if it never regained the 
levels of the late Empire. In the beginning rearmament boom, engineers did 
even better, since ever more elaborate advertisements in their journals show 
that they were everywhere in demand.17  
In terms of social status, the result of NS policies was more problematic. In 
spite of the initial egalitarianism of the left wing of the Nazi Party, the academ-
ic professions escaped being swallowed up in the amorphous German Labor 
Front and won party recognition through special Hauptämter. But the price was 
the acceptance of uniformity in a larger legal front (Rechtsfront), including 
non-academic legal aides, or in a single teacher type, dominated by primary 
schoolteachers, and in one engineering profession, comprising all gradations 
from university to lower level training. One writer commented that “philologist 
circles are incensed about their Gleichschaltung with primary teachers in the 
NSLB.” Since press clipping files show that many Nazis shared Hitler’s per-
sonal antipathy toward attorneys and dislike of schoolteachers, only engineers 
gained social esteem in the Third Reich. On the local level Akademiker were 
still sought after as effective propagandists or administrators, but the party 
remained suspicious of their unconditional loyalty.18 
The impact of ideological nazification on professional practice was consid-
erable, although it lagged continually behind NSDAP expectations. In a mix-
ture of repression and motivation, the NS professional organizations used rede-
fined codes of ethics, countless indoctrination camps (Schulungslager) and 
economic rewards (consulting jobs) to assure ideological conformity.19 How 
did the new values of “state, race, soil, work and honor” affect legal practice? 
The crucial change was the redefinition of the role of the attorney to “an organ 
of the administration of justice [Rechtspflege]” which made it “his professional 
                                                             
17  See the regular column on Berufsbetreuung in the law journal or the Mitteilungsblatt des 
NSRB (1937ff); and H. Droege, “Gegenwartsprobleme der Anwaltschaft,” Deutsches Recht, 
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Wandel des Lehrerideals in den Augen der reiferen Jugend,” Deutsche Höhere Schule, 7 
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and 16 respectively. Cf. also F. Mehnert, ed., Partei-Statistik. Stand 1. Januar 1935 
(Munich, 1935?), p. 70f. 
19  H. Frank, “Nationalsozialistischer Ehrenschutz,” Deutsches Recht, 7 (1937), p. 265ff; G. 
Mauntz, “Der Sinn der nationalpolitischen Schulungslehrgänge für Erzieher,” Deutsche 
Höhere Schule, 2 (1935), p. 400ff; and Deutschlandberichte, March 14, April 12, 1935. For 
the self-policing of the professions cf. also M. Hachenburg, Lebenserinnerungen eines 
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task to represent, in the interest of his client, what he considers true and right in 
a given case.” Conciliation rather than litigation became the imperative, so 
much so that some commentators declared appeals with little chance of success 
unethical! The party also instituted a legal consulting service, “voluntarily” 
carried out by attorneys, which in some 258,603 cases discouraged going to 
court, in 5,688 incidents suggested a formal compromise, and referred only 
39,872 instances to a lawyer for further action (1938). At the same time, the 
notion of Volksschädling (parasite) politicized common crime, making it harder 
to defend the declining number of criminals (due to rising prosperity and 
harsher punishments). Hence lawyers had to scramble for business in civil 
cases such as countless paternity suits, brought on by the racial laws, or divorce 
cases, encouraged by the curiously progressive no-fault principle (Zerrüttungs-
prinzip).20  
In the high-schools, the transformation of professional practice was equally 
thorough. The NSLB high-school teacher section leader K. Frank defined the 
new goals:  
We should no longer educate men crammed with as much knowledge as poss-
ible, but physically healthy, racially conscious Germans, capable of indepen-
dent judgment and possessing strong character, who are in touch with and 
rooted in the blood and soil of their home and actively participate in the living 
rhythm of their nationality [Volkstum]. 
In order to become “lively educators and leaders of youth” secondary education 
majors were forced to begin their study with two semesters at a teachers’ col-
lege (Hochschule für Lehrerbildung) together with public schoolteacher train-
ees. The key change in “transforming the spirit of the school” involved the 
introduction of “human genetics and racial science into the curriculum” in 
September 1933: “Beyond the basic facts, [teachers] should stress implications 
for all subjects and areas of life as well as build national socialist conscious-
ness.” History also became more significant, although in a strangely twisted 
way. “Not economics or the course of fate are the motive forces of the world, 
people and state, but thought and will stemming from racial sources as well as 
the men who possess and implement them.” In general, the Germanic subjects 
now grew into the core of the curriculum, while the tasks of character building 
and physical toughening loomed larger than traditional intellectual pursuits.21  
                                                             
20  W. Raeke, “Vier Jahre nationalsozialistischer Rechtsgestaltung,” Deutsches Recht, 7 
(1937), p. 3f; H. Droege, “Wahrheitssuche und Rechtssuche – die wirksamsten Waffen des 
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recht,” ibid., 8 (1938), p. 353ff; and “Rechtsbetreuung 1938,” ibid., 9 (1939), no. 11. 
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Höhere Schule, 3 (1936), p. 564ff; W. Erxleben, “Die Berufsvorbildung der Philologen,” 
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The professional sphere of the engineers was only apparently less touched 
by ideological considerations. For a while the inherent conflict between tech-
nical innovation and business profit seemed suspended in the Nazi emphasis on 
production over costs (such as in the development of costly synthetic fuels). 
The sweeping state projects of peoples’ radio or car (Volkswagen) and the 
building of the Autobahnen could encourage a nationalist technological mystic-
ism, documented in glossy photo-essays on the achievement of German tech-
nology. The triple agenda of achieving military, raw material, and economic 
independence (Wehr-, Rohstoff-, and Energiefreiheit) posed a formidable chal-
lenge in developing arms designs, substituting Ersatz materials and rationaliz-
ing production. But, the anti-industrial and anti-urban tendencies of Nazi ideol-
ogy made this politicized Nordic technology (Technopolitik) an uneasy 
amalgam of contradictory impulses. Hence restored employment had greater 
impact on everyday professional life of engineers, many of whom did not both-
er to reflect on what they were building for.22 
The effect of the Nazi measures upon the organized pursuit of collective in-
terests was also contradictory. In spite of the national community rhetoric of 
the Third Reich and the surface impression of uniformity, intense struggles 
continued both within professions and among occupations. Of course, the polit-
ical primacy of the NSDAP continued unchallenged. But, it remained conti-
nually in question which party formation was in control – the NS-professional 
organization, the professional party office (such as the Hauptamt für Erzieh-
ung), the party chancellery under Hess/Bormann, the Reich Chancellery under 
Lammers, the respective ministry (such as Justice, under Gürtner), Himmler’s 
SS, or any one of the variety of economic and other interest groups. Hence, 
within the overall guidelines of NS-ideology, professional organizations lived 
in a Darwinian world of struggles for survival, depending for their success and 
influence on the fate of their respective protector.23  
Within the professions, the junior ranks managed to improve their lot 
somewhat, without fundamentally altering the hegemony of the professional 
elites. Each of the NS professional affiliates had a special section for entering 
professionals (such as Assessoren) which held separate meetings, was granted 
                                                                                                                                
“Vererbungslehre und Rassenkunde im Unterricht,” ibid. p. 121f; D. Schäfer, “Grundsätze 
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22  Todt, “Ingenieur und Reichsautobahn,” Deutsche Technik, 3 (1935), no. 6; “Aufgaben der 
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23  W. Feiten, Der Nationalsozialistische Lehrerbund. Entwicklung und Organisation (Wein-
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some subordinate space in the journals, and sought to vocalize the grievances 
of its constituency, occasionally even through petitions to the appropriate min-
istry. In spite of this considerable activity (which mainly served to defuse the 
frustrations of the younger cohorts), the organizations and ministries were 
dominated by senior professionals and not very responsive to the plight of the 
young. Only the general improvement of the professional market ultimately 
neutralized junior discontent.24 
In the competition between professions, the lawyers also scored some initial 
successes, since their disastrous situation made energetic measures politically 
persuasive. In a remarkable law of July 1933 they managed to exclude all non-
attorneys from the courts, thereby effectively barring para-legals from appear-
ing on behalf of their clients. Similarly, in October 1934, attorneys succeeded 
in pushing industry-employed syndics with lawyer qualifications out of the 
courtroom. However, the incensed protests of the concerned competitors 
backed by industry eventually reversed some of these displacement measures 
so that, in the end, Rechtspfleger were readmitted as a more circumscribed 
section, into the legal front (renamed NSRB) and Syndici were only forbidden 
to appear on behalf of their employers. A similar struggle between academic 
dentists and artisan dental technicians also did not result in a full victory of the 
former.25  
Nevertheless, a process of professionalization also continued in some areas 
of the Third Reich. In Prussia, notary publics had been combined with lawyers. 
However, on July 1, 1937, they became a “free profession, whose members 
stand in a public trust relationship to the Führer.” Other occupations succeeded 
in professionalizing for the first time, such as the trustees who combined legal 
and accounting functions. Recognized as “Wirtschaftstreuhänder NSRB” they 
established testing as well as admissions criteria and formed a subsection of the 
jurists league. For others, such as the primary schoolteachers, control of the NS 
affiliate (NSLB), the Abitur requirement for study at the Hochschulen für Leh-
rerbildung as well as the NS rhetoric of a “uniform teachers’ estate” meant 
steady progress in their long climb towards professional respectability. The 
continued power of the existing professions and elites was purchased at the 
                                                             
24  As examples of activity, “Reichslehrgang für Jungerzieher,” Deutsche Höhere Schule, 4 
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price of some concessions to the aspirations of rising groups.26 While populist 
strains in NS-ideology could be used to justify further professionalization, 
elitist tendencies of the same ideas could be employed to reject such demands. 
Ultimately, the greatest dynamism of “professionalism” in the Third Reich, 
however, lay neither in the established nor aspiring groups, but, with consider-
ably altered meaning of the term, in the rapid expansion of party, military and 
SS cadres.27  
In the long run, German professionals faced not the cheerful prospect of re- 
but the chilling specter of deprofessionalization in the Third Reich. While 
initially retaining some of their material gains, the nazified professions expe-
rienced severe losses in recruitment, competence, autonomy, and organization. 
For instance, the manpower planning of the Nazi ministries turned out to be a 
complete fiasco. After the purge of the remaining Jews in 1938 (World War I 
veterans or pre-1914 appointees) the number of legal professionals decreased 
by about one quarter from around 19,200 in 1933 to about 15,000 attorneys in 
1939. Similarly, about 5% of 37,500 high-school teachers were dismissed, 
demoted, or transferred. Only the engineers seem to have escaped relatively 
unscathed, even though the NSBDT also expelled about 1,500 Jews. Between 
1932 and 1938, student numbers contracted dramatically from around 128,000 
to about 57,500 with law students shrinking from 18,364 to 4,275, students in 
the philosophical faculty contracting from 46,243 to 16,049, and students in the 
Technische Hochschulen declining from 20,834 to 9,524!28 This drastic drop in 
the pool of prospective professionals was a result of the twenty-five percent fall 
in the birthrate during the First World War. This reduced the number of Prus-
sian high-school graduates from 19,821 (1932) to 12,418 (1936). Concurrently, 
the proliferation of attractive career alternatives in the rebuilding military and 
in the resurging economy cut the proportion of Abiturienten willing to study 
from 78.3% (1928) to 47.9% (1935). Because of mistaken governmental meas-
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ures and misunderstood social changes, fewer youths of a shrinking pool went 
on to higher education.29  
Eventually, the professional purge and sharp decrease in college graduates 
produced a drastic shortage of professional manpower. “While public opinion 
before the seizure of power was impressed by the overcrowding of the profes-
sions,” the statistician Ch. Lorenz drily commented, “in the last prewar years, it 
became increasingly clear that the future supply of graduates would not in any 
way suffice for the increasing demand.” Since the Luftwaffe could not get 
enough technicians in 1936, the science ministry advanced the slogan “Germa-
ny needs capable engineers!” When the last unemployed graduates found 
teaching positions in 1937, E. Simon predicted that “a deficit of teachers can be 
expected with certainty.” Even the chronically overcrowded lawyers began to 
debate the coming “shortage of judges as a danger for the administration of 
justice.”30 By the late 1930s, the severity of the manpower shortage forced the 
established professionals to abandon their protectionism and the Nazi govern-
ment to abrogate many of its restrictions on university study (especially for 
women) and entry into the professions (through shortening the practical train-
ing period). But the initial overreaction to Weimar overcrowding eventually 
endangered the very survival of the professions, since they could no longer 
attract enough young graduates.31  
At the same time, the quality of incoming professionals deteriorated signifi-
cantly, threatening a loss of standards and expertise. Since they could use the 
decline of Leistung of the pupils to defend their own turf, teachers openly dis-
cussed the drop in performance under the euphemistic heading of “improving 
performance in the high-school.” Faced with competition by the ubiquitous 
Hitler Youth and the loss of a whole school year, educators argued: “We must 
reawaken in the young respect for thorough and patient work and denounce as 
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vermin anyone who opposes us in this.”32 Although it was dangerous to debate 
such problems publicly during the Third Reich, lawyers also referred to “the 
well known fears of the decline in the general level of training” at the universi-
ty – only to refute them, since lack of factual knowledge could be remedied by 
superior ideology, character, etc. Law professors and practicing attorneys re-
sponded to the quality drop in students by suggesting that legal studies be made 
more practical through “practitioners’ workshops (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) at 
the universities.”33 
Because the erosion of competence was more visible and dangerous in the 
technical professions, it was more openly condemned. “We cannot and must 
not go on like this!” protested the professor of engineering and Old Fighter W. 
Gürtler to Hitler: “If you don’t intercede, the whole coming generation of 
young technicians will go to the devil.” The many new “social and national 
activities” of students necessarily meant that “the purely professional achieve-
ments decline.” The war reinforced the existing trend: “If the training level was 
untenable before, we now experience a catastrophic drop in mastery of infor-
mation.” The ensuing consultation of the relevant ministries by the Reich 
Chancellery yielded a disturbing unanimity of complaints. Even the High 
Command of the army deplored “the ever greater decline of knowledge, of 
logical thinking and clear expression as well as the decreasing command of the 
German language in word and speech.” The causes of this deterioration of 
training were controversial, since their full analysis would uncover the bank-
ruptcy of Nazi educational policy. The “continued sinking” in the level of 
training could only have led to a decline in actual professional competence.34  
At the same time, the internal autonomy of professional practice was simi-
larly lost. Although lawyers hailed the establishment of a national bar associa-
tion (Reichsrechtsanwaltskammer) in 1933 as fulfillment of a long-standing 
aim, it ultimately turned from an articulate advocate of professional aims into 
                                                             
32  E. Schwarzinger, “Leistungssteigerung in der Höheren Schule,” Deutsche Höhere Schule, 8 
(1941), p. 342ff; W. Schuh, “Höhere Schule und akademische Nachwuchsfrage,” ibid., 11 
(144), p. 2ff; Socialist reports were full of complaints: “North-West German pedagogues 
inform us of the incredibly poor performances of the high-schools.” Deutschlandberichte, 
March 14, 1935. Cf. D. Horn, “The Hitler Youth and Educational Decline in the Third 
Reich,” History of Education Quarterly, 16 (1976), pp. 425-447. 
33  Prof. F. Klausing, “Zum Rechtsstudium von Kriegsteilnehmern,” Deutsches Recht, 11 
(1941), p. 2549ff; State Secretary Rothenberger, “Nahziele der Ausbildungsreform” ibid., 
13 (1943), p. 2ff; and “Ursachen, Werden und Zwecke der Praktiker-Arbeitsgemeinschaften 
an den Universitäten,” ibid., 14 (1944), p. 385ff. 
34  Quotes from H. Seier, “Niveaukritik und partielle Opposition. Zur Lage an den deutschen 
Hochschulen 1939/40,” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 58 (1976), pp. 227-246; and Giles, 
Students and National Socialism, ch. 6. While the full extent of this erosion of standards 
cannot be documented precisely, widespread complaints of even convinced Nazis indicate 
that it was quite real. Cf. H. Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, 1938-1945. Die ge-
heimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS (Herrsching, 1984), 2, p. 283f. 
 173 
an instrument of control. Its self-discipline through an ethics code and honor 
courts was gradually politicized and turned over during the war to the adminis-
trative courts in order to ensure that self-discipline became nazification – a 
final symbolic blow. Teachers who had always been at the mercy of their bu-
reaucratic superiors now saw the sanctity of their classroom eroded by Hitler 
Youth (pupils) and NSLB (colleagues) informers who often initiated adminis-
trative discipline cases. In contrast, the engineers maintained a somewhat 
greater internal independence, since they depended upon their industrial em-
ployers who might or might not place ideological conformity above technical 
competence.35  
After the Gleichschaltung, there was little doubt that the professions had ir-
retrievably lost their external autonomy as well. The Nazi professional affili-
ates enjoyed an organizational monopoly which made membership a virtual 
prerequisite for continuing practice. Lawyers had to belong to the local bar 
association (Rechtsanwaltskammer) in order to practice and only members of 
the NSRB were listed in the published professional directories. After the disso-
lution of the Philologenverband in March 1936, reluctant high-school teachers 
were “encouraged” in no uncertain terms to join the NSLB, if they wanted to 
keep their jobs and insurance benfits. Only engineers had greater latitude, but 
in order to escape the clutches of the German Labor Front most preferred the 
“professional” NSBDT.36  
Within the large Nazi professional organizations, the representatives of an 
individual profession could only play a subordinate role. Among the “German 
judges ... notaries, para-legals, officials, young jurists, legal economists, and 
university professors,” attorneys were but one group, constituting some fifteen 
percent of the over 100,000 NSRB members. Similarly, among the seven sec-
tions of the NSLB, ranging from kindergarten teachers to university professors, 
the Philologen were but one column in “the grand parade of the community of 
German educators,” accounting for little more than ten percent of the approx-
imately 300,000 members. Alone among the technical occupations were the 
42,000 VDI members (1938) strong enough to dominate NSBDT organization, 
two to three times its size, since they provided its working core. Hence attor-
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neys and high-school teachers had great difficulty in formulating and pushing 
through their demands within the NS organizations, let alone beyond them.37  
This lack of clout was compounded by the decreasing importance of NS 
professional organizations in the power struggles of the Third Reich. While the 
jurists’, teachers’, and technicians’ leagues initially wielded considerable influ-
ence in pressing for legal and practical reforms, by the second half of the 1930s 
the ministries reasserted themselves. Even the establishment of party offices for 
law, education, and technology (Hauptämter) could not disguise the increasing 
functionalization of the NS affiliates for indoctrination (Schulung). “The NSLB 
does not have the same significance for an educator as the earlier teachers’ 
association which was both a union and place for further training.” More and 
more information and orders flowed from the top down, so that even convinced 
NS professionals gradually found themselves without channels of influence 
from below, except for an occasional appeal to the party chancellery which 
might produce startling results. With the promulgation of “Total War” in 1943 
the NSLB was completely suspended, the NSRB reduced to a shadow of its 
former self, and only the NSBDT continued to flourish as organizer of war-
time production.38  
The Second World War strengthened these deprofessionalizing tendencies 
through impairing practice and warping ethics, even if it initially energized 
professionals in the service of a greater cause. Since academics were less en-
thusiastic in 1939 than in 1914, Nazi professional leaders like Frank tried hard-
er to mobilize their support: “The die has been cast. The German people are 
joining the struggle of justice against injustice and despotism.” For lawyers, the 
war became a test of internal order. For teachers, the challenge was to reinforce 
the “’warlike spirit’ and psychological determination of the German people.” 
For engineers, the task was even more simple – building the weapons to defeat 
the enemy.39 Considerable numbers of professionals were forced to abandon 
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their occupation and join the armed forces. About one half of the attorneys 
served in the military (around 8,000 lawyers in 1940); approximately one third 
of the male teachers (especially the younger Assessoren) was at the front; and 
many engineers were also mobilized (Kriegseinsatz), albeit often in armament 
factories at home.40 
The economic and social disruption of the war hit the free professionals es-
pecially hard. Initially, military service threatened lawyer families with a dras-
tic loss of income, until a somewhat more generous system of support pay-
ments was worked out. More deleterious was the disruption of legal practice, 
since clients would either switch to other attorneys or cease litigating in spite of 
the accelerated simplification of legal procedures (Rechtsvereinfachung). Be-
cause of “the noticeable and considerable decline of business” there were many 
“reports about the bad economic position of the lawyers.” While teachers at the 
front were more financially secure (they continued to receive their regular pay), 
those left behind had to cover the nearly one quarter to one third shortfall of 
hours through greater exertions of their own. Moreover, they were always 
asked to “volunteer” for civil defense, social work, and other Nazi activities. 
Even NS observers habitually complained about the “evident lack of respect for 
teachers” due to the “deteriorating performance” of pupils or widespread 
”school problems” such as “lack of personnel, of rooms and of coal” and even 
of textbooks! Though the engineers were rewarded with some pay raises, they 
also had to work much overtime, struggle with deteriorating material condi-
tions and participate in various technical emergency services. Some measures 
sought to help students or veterans (the dropping of the HfL requirement in 
education, the abbreviating of courses of study in engineering, and the shorten-
ing of practical training for attorneys to two years). But the bulk of the estab-
lished professionals experienced a decided deterioration of their working con-
ditions during the Second World War, making “professional prospects ... 
extraordinarily poor.”41  
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Eventually the totalitarian dynamism of the Third Reich led to a deformation 
of professional ethics, and this occurred in many instances, not only in the 
well-known case of medicine. Attempts to cleanse the professions of “Weimar 
abuses” or to build a nazified professionalism based upon völkisch values 
foundered on external expansionism and internal repression which burst all 
bonds of professional expertise and restraint. Facilitated by the tradition of 
legal positivism, the transformation of the occupational universe of lawyers 
occurred in three steps. General clauses (such as “the common good supercedes 
individual good”) served to abrogate liberal conceptions of individual rights. 
Legalized injustice, such as the discrimination against and expropriation of 
German Jews, altered the sense of justice of positive law. Finally, extra-legal or 
rather illegal party, secret police, or SS measures removed ever wider areas 
from legal control altogether.42 Participating in legal robbery of Jewish proper-
ty, all nicely according to regulation, dulled professional consciences. Defend-
ing criminals, opponents of the regime, or persecuted groups, became more and 
more dangerous, so that an attorney needed exceptional courage to represent 
precisely those clients who needed it most. In political cases “administrative 
acts ..., measures of the Führer ..., and the official-political activity of the par-
ty” there was no longer any legal recourse. The warping of legal ethics is ap-
parent in the rewriting of the “honors code” which not only proscribed tradi-
tional malfeasance (such as incompetence, etc.), but added entire new 
categories such as “lack of understanding for the social institutions of the 
present state,” association with Jews or homosexuals, and the like. In cases 
where both imperatives collided, Nazism more and more began to outweigh 
professionalism.43  
The pedagogical framework for the teaching profession was transformed 
dramatically as well. The German high-school “together with other educational 
forces in the people, has the task of forming National Socialist man with its 
particular means.” Directed towards making “real human beings, shaped 
through blood and historical fate,” the new pedagogy of the Nazis stressed not 
intellectualism but character building, leadership and practical work.44 Instead 
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of imparting knowledge and developing the mind, this agenda meant above all 
indoctrination in “the Jewish question” (based on notoriously forged Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion) or in “the military spirit” (wehrgeistige Erziehung). The 
personal ambition of the Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach led the 
Hitler Youth to claim ideological responsibility for education as its prerogative. 
This embittered teachers who were confronted daily with tired and unmotivated 
youths for whom camping and hiking were more fun than memorizing Latin 
verbs. Frequent protestations of cooperation between HJ and school indicate 
continuing frictions, even after the children had been divided Solomonically, 
with classroom time returned to the teachers and leisure time turned over to the 
youth organization. The “further decline of standards,” the demands for volun-
teer work such as the incessant collections of everything from old bones to 
money, the disruptions of the Kinderlandverschickung as well as of para-
military service (as Flakhelfer) and the endemic tensions with the HJ had, as 
even committed Nazi teachers like O. Nehring admitted, “to shake their profes-
sional ethos.”45  
The ethical conflict for engineers was less clearly defined and less candidly 
expressed. While initial hopes for a technocratic and non-capitalist economy 
were quickly disappointed, the growing career opportunities for the Speer 
generation made the Third Reich seem exceptionally open to the challenges of 
modern technology. All too few bothered to notice the narrowness of “German 
science” or the irrational trends in biology, racial hygiene, or ethnology. Under 
the determined leadership of Fritz Todt (VDI chairman 1938-1942), the 
NSBDT could use its expertise in weapons’ design and arms production even 
for “a kind of ‘seizure of power’ over the war economy.” But with growing 
responsibility came increasing frustrations: “The threatening reduction of pro-
duction because of decreased energy availability ... created a great wave of 
unrest and industrial disturbances over the entire Reich” when the Blitzkrieg 
bogged down in Russia. While special “rationalization engineers” were sup-
posed to guarantee a more efficient use of resources, “technical difficulties” of 
production and distribution multiplied and a heavy layer of red-tape vitiated the 
impulse to save. Moreover, the fresh engineering recruits from the Technische 
Hochschulen were ever less well prepared while the lack of sufficient food 
lowered “the intellectual performance” of “workers of the mind.” From 1943 
on increasing Allied bombing also led to “a lack of transportation ... of building 
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material ... of telephone connections” as well as to an insufficient energy 
supply and an “absence of bureaucratic help” so that entire factories were 
moved to safer areas. ... While the worsening economic situation increased the 
power of engineers (as Arbeitseinsatz Ingenieure they had the authority to 
reassign labor), it forced them to employ their rational talents for ever more 
irrational NS goals.46  
Ultimately, the deterioration of the professionals’ situation also made it 
harder to reconcile National Socialism with professionalism. Leading political 
and professional spokesmen often proclaimed their inseparable identity: “In the 
tenth year of the Nazi Revolution jurists also have completely joined the 
movement, so that they have now become the guardian of the new popular 
order ....” On the one hand Nazi professionals had to justify themselves against 
critics in the party, emphasizing that “even the best judge and the most cir-
cumspect official is not capable of replacing the work of an attorney.” On the 
other hand they had to defend their ideology against skeptical colleagues: “It is 
crucial that the lawyer consider himself first a legal servant indebted to the 
national socialist state or the national community and only secondly as repre-
sentative of his client.” In the Third Reich, recognition of the irreplaceability of 
a profession depended upon its fusion of National Socialism and technical 
expertise.47  
How did individual professionals combine these imperatives? The choice of 
reaction depended upon time (the regime’s popularity changed with success or 
failure), religion (with Catholics more reluctant), age (youth being more sus-
ceptible), occupational standing (primary schoolteachers were particularly 
zealous) or previous politics (former activists were more resistant), just to name 
a few factors. A small group of “truly fanatic” Nazis who happened also to be 
professionals marks one extreme. Men like R. Freisler, H. Schemm, or G.  
Feder were more National Socialists than professionals. “I am first a national 
socialist and only then a teacher,” the high-school section leader K. Frank 
confessed typically. As Old Fighters, they had joined the party before 1930 and 
founded professional affiliates to help win elections or provide expertise for the 
party (legal advice) and only then thought of nazifying other professionals. 
They took pride in their political career as Gauleiter or other higher functionary 
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and resolved the tension between ideology and professionalism unhesitatingly 
in favor of the former.48  
A second limited group were National Socialist professionals who sincerely 
believed in both sets of values and tried to reconcile them with each other. Men 
like the president of the national bar association R. Neubert, but also leading 
ministerial officials and NS engineers propagated both “unreserved dedication 
to the work of the Führer” and the preservation “of a healthy, self-governing 
legal profession.” While internally such NS professionals sometimes defended 
their profession against ideological zealots, they externally also served to en-
force the nazification of their colleagues. This made them particularly danger-
ous. Perhaps this is also the group into which the ambitious architect Albert 
Speer belongs, if one can grant the subjective honesty of his fusion between 
technology and national rebuilding. Initially influential, these professional 
idealists faced ever increasing problems with the deprofessionalizing dynamics 
of the later years of the Third Reich which shattered their synthesis of oppo-
sites.49 
More difficult to document is the majority of collaborating professionals. 
Formally members of at least the appropriate NS professional organization, 
sometimes even nominal members (Karteimitglieder) of the NSDAP, these 
men adopted Nazi slogans unthinkingly or cynically, but continued their pro-
fessional practice within the new conditions of the Third Reich much as before. 
A Socialist observer noted in 1935: “The teachers are intimidated and do not 
resist.” Recurrent complaints of the Nazi fanatics or idealist professionals about 
their apathy or opportunism indicate the existence of this large group. Since 
their National Socialism tended to be only skin deep, it produced few conflicts 
with professionalism. Prevalent in law and education such Mitläufer shaded 
over into the neutral professionals, preoccupied with specific work and largely 
oblivious to the ideological demands upon their occupation. The bulk of the 
engineers probably fits into this category which evaded the conflict between 
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professionalism and Nazism by ignoring the latter and carried on in non-
political competence. “The mood of the teachers is depressed, they work with-
out any professional pride [Berufsfreude]” another critic reported in 1936. 
“Basically the educators are as apolitical as before.”50  
Beyond this inert mass of professionals, there were a courageous few whose 
professionalism forced them to be critical of the Third Reich and to oppose its 
policies. Many now forgotten individuals sought to preserve a small corner of 
objectivity and rationality within the irrational system by maintaining profes-
sional standards in their work. In the courts, the classroom, or the factory, for 
instance, the use of irony, of double-entendre or excessive compliance could 
break the Nazi spell by ridiculing its earnest pretensions. While not overtly 
political, such “inner passive resistance [Resistenz]” was an important act of 
refusal to conform. This exasperated NS fanatics. Others dared to go further 
and embarked on overt opposition in spite of the risk of losing their livelihood, 
having to escape into exile or being sent to a concentration camp. Some attor-
neys, such as Dietrich Güstrow, courageously defended their clients in largely 
politicized cases at the threat of disbarment; some teachers, such as Heinrich 
Rodenstein, pursued the truth with their pupils when it contradicted Nazi prop-
aganda at the risk of expulsion; and even some engineers such as F. Todt, in his 
last weeks, recognized the irrationality of Nazi technology by trying to prepare 
for life after Hitler.51 All too few extraordinary individuals realized that Nation-
al Socialism and professionalism, understood as responsibility for humane 
justice, liberal education, or efficient technology, were inherently incompatible.  
The Third Reich disappointed hopes in a reprofessionalization and inaugu-
rated a widespread deprofessionalization. While initially professionals could 
applaud the solution to the Weimar professional crisis as the restoration of a 
“national” professionalism, eventually they were confronted with the very 
opposite: a drastic and far-reaching loss of professionalism. In the long run, the 
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Third Reich threatened precisely those values which it was meant to preserve. 
For many professionals, educational standards and practical competence de-
clined, while fewer and fewer young people chose such a thankless career. 
Though some professions were economically secure, their social esteem also 
deteriorated in comparison with the party, the army, or the SS. Professional 
ethics were transformed into conformity with Nazi ideology, explicitly reject-
ing their liberal and humanitarian origins, and autonomy of practice as well as 
organizational independence was lost. During the last war years even con-
vinced Nazis like Hans Frank, in a series of controversial speeches, began to 
deplore the destruction of the Rechtsstaat, the perversion of Wissenschaft 
(through medical experiments), and the abuse of technology. The attempt to 
save professionalism through an alliance with National Socialism made pre-
cisely for its ultimate destruction. As the Socialist educational politician Kurt 
Löwenstein wrote acerbically in exile: “Never have German schools seen so 
much beating and so little learning.”52  
The causes for this reversal of professional fortunes are complex. Certainly 
external circumstances, such as the change from rebuilding prosperity to the 
strains of wartime shortages played a considerable role in their socio-economic 
deterioration. But internal NS factors such as the dominance of an irrational 
ideology and the totality of organizational control also contributed to the de-
cline of professionalism. Moreover, the dynamism of the Third Reich would 
not be contained in a “German” law, education, or technology, but rather 
pushed beyond all restraints of professional rationality, thereby dooming the 
hybrid of Nazi professionalism. In individual professions this process worked 
out somewhat differently. Closest to the political core of Nazi power, lawyers 
were under the most direct pressure. Every day they had to confront the basic 
contradiction between a nazified legal order and an ideologized illegality. 
Teachers were somewhat less directly affected, but still under considerable 
pressure. In shaping the views of future generations their propaganda was es-
sential to the long-run stability of the Third Reich. Ostensibly furthest removed 
from the party, engineers could carry on with least disruption. Yet the “neu-
trality” of technology turned out to be an illusion when engineering provided 
the tools for war and genocide. It took the impending loss of the war to bring 
this awful realization home to German professionals. Their partly enthusiastic, 
partly opportunistic, partly acquiescent pact with National Socialism had mere-
                                                             
52  K. Löwenstein, “Das Trümmerfeld der reichsdeutschen Schule,” reprinted in Lehrer und 
Schule pp. 95-98. The concept of deprofessionalization is just beginning to be discussed. 
Logically, it should be understood as a reversal of professionalization, as a loss of some of 
its criteria. See P.U. Unschuld, “Professionalisierung im Bereich der Medizin,” Saeculum, 
25 (1974), pp. 251-276. Anderson, “The Academy of German Law,” ch. 8; B. Müller-Hill, 
“Tödliche Wissenschaft. Die verdrängte Geschichte der Humangenetik unter Hitler,” Die 
Zeit, July 20, 1984; and O. Ottweiler, Die Volksschule im Nationalsozialismus (Weinheim, 
1979). 
 182 
ly yielded initial benefits. Instead of profiting from the Third Reich, they were 
going down with it. This disillusionment became widespread after 1943 – but it 
came too late to extricate professionals from their complicity.53 
In a broader perspective, this collaboration was but the culmination of a 
long-range reversal of professional allegiances. The liberal and humane vision 
which had made professionalization in the first half of the nineteenth century a 
progressive force, began to fade into a satisfaction with the status quo during 
Imperial Germany, when professionals were accepted, albeit as junior partners, 
into the ruling elites. The success of the “professionalization project” of the 
akademische Berufe rested on the exclusion of less qualified competitors (legal 
consultants, primary schoolteachers, technicians) and on increasing specializa-
tion, both of which undercut the professional service ethic. During the crises of 
the Weimar Republic, the vision of professionalism narrowed decisively into a 
defense of material self-interest. In the hyperinflation and Great Depression the 
broader view which saw professionalism as guarantor of justice, learning, and 
technology gave way to a narrower conception, directed towards controlling 
entry into the profession, assuring adequate income, and maintaining the social 
status of professionals. At the same time academic nationalism, which had been 
a forward-looking force during the external and internal unification became 
chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, and sexist. Though they differed in style, national 
traditionalists could therefore willingly cooperate with völkisch revolutionaries 
as long as these respected some professional niceties such as continuity of 
personnel, maintenance of minimum competence, and international respectabil-
ity. Confronted with threats to their very survival, most professionals chose, not 
surprisingly, material security over professional freedom. Instead of serving as 
a barrier against the barbarities of the Nazis, the professions played an impor-
tant role in shoring up the system, in carrying out the atrocities of the war and 
the genocide efficiently. The narrowing of professionalism logically led to its 
complete instrumentalization.54  
The perils of professionalism are, therefore, as pervasive as its benefits. 
There is no need to stretch the “Weimar analogy” and to argue that the United 
States professions of the mid-1980s are on the verge of collaborating with an 
                                                             
53  The Nazi professional journals do not betray any doubts in ultimate victory. Thierack, 
“Zum Jahresbeginn 1945,” Deutsches Recht, 15 (1945), p. 1. Cf. also M.H. Kater, “Die 
‘Gesundheitsführung’ des Deutschen Volkes,” Medizinhistorisches Journal, 18 (1983), pp. 
349-375. For the broader background see also M. Geyer, “The State in National Socialist 
Germany,” in: C. Bright, ed., Statemaking and Social Movements (Ann Arbor, 1984), pp. 
193-232. 
54  K.H. Jarausch, Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic 
Illiberalism (Princeton, 1982); A. Beyerchen, Scientists under Hitler: Politics and the Phys-
ics Community in the Third Reich (New Haven, 1977), p. 206f; I. Staff, ed., Justiz im Drit-
ten Reich. Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt, 1978, 2nd ed.), pp. 124-146; and comments on 
the professional reversal by T.S. Hamerow (Chapel Hill, November 7, 1984). 
 183 
American “fascism” (whatever that might mean).55 The lesson of this cautio-
nary tale lies deeper. Even under the best of circumstances the professions run 
certain inherent dangers which had particularly nefarious consequences in the 
German case. First, there is the threat of excessive materialism, the greedy 
preoccupation with monetary return and social status which seeks to aggrandize 
the established professionals vis a vis their clients and newcomers. Second, 
there is the peril of ethical formalism, obeying the written conduct codes while 
violating their moral intent. And third, there is the danger of blinkered organi-
zational egotism, putting narrow special interests above the common good. In 
the larger historical perspective, modern professionalism was one of the great 
achievements of a liberal middle class, believing in expertise, responsibility, 
and self-government. The Nazi case, powerfully dramatized by Rolf Hochhuth 
in the play Juristen, demonstrates the perils of detaching it from this heritage. 
In the modern world, professionalism can only exert a beneficial influence if it 
rejects self-aggrandizement and returns to its idealistic, altruistic, and in the 
broad sense, liberal core.56 
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